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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 




LOIS s. COOK, et al. I 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS IN 
OPPOSITION TO APPELLANT'S 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
No. 16231 
This is an action whereby plaintiffs-
respondents, LUCILLE JESSE MOFFAT THORNOCK, et al., 
(hereinafter "THORNOCK"), seek to quiet title, pursuant 
to §78-40-1, et seq.,. Utah Code Ann. (Repl. Vol. 9A 
1977), to all minerals in, upon, or under certain real 
property located in Rich County, Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The First Judicial District Court in and for 
Rich County, the Honorable VeNoy Christofferson, pre-
siding, granted plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
and entered its Judgment and Decree of Quiet Title on 
October 23, 1978 (R. 349, 358-61, and 354-57, respec-
tively). 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment was 
considered by the court below on three separate occa-
sions. An initial hearing was held on April 17, 1978, 
which was continued, without date, for the purpose of 
allowing both parties an opportunity to file additional 
documents. A second hearing was held on September 5, 
1978, subsequent to which, defendant-appellant, Lois s. 
Cook, (hereinafter "COOK"), filed her Second Amended 
Answer and Counterclaim (R. 339-48). 
Subsequent to the grant of summary judgment ~ 
the court below, COOK filed an "Objection to Plaintiffs 
Proposed Decree of Quiet Title, Judgment and Order 
Releasing Lis Pendens and Motion for Reargument" (R. 
368-72). After these three separate opportunities for 
consideration of the issues involved, on December 11, 
1978, the lower court rendered its Memorandum Decision 
denying COOK's Objection and Motion (R. 377). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant-Appellant, COOK, seeks reversal of 
the lower court's Judgment of November 16, 1978, of that 
court's Memorandum Decision dated December 11, 1978, and 
a rehearing of her arguments on appeal. 
- 2 -
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Plaintiffs-Respondents, THORNOCK, seek affir-
mation of the Judgment of November 16, 1978, the Decree 
of Quiet Title of that same date and of the Memorandum 
Decision of December 11, 1978. In addition, THORNOCK 
seeks a denial of COOK'S Petition for Rehearing. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
For purposes of brevity, THORNOCK adopts the 
Statement of Facts as contained in her Brief on Appeal. 
However, THORNOCK wishes to again emphasize that those 
arguments presented by COOK pertain to only 353 of the 
1,946 acres involved in this action. 
COOK asserts title through adverse possession 
by reason of certain alleged defects in THORNOCK's chain 
of title. Those alleged defects pertain only to 353 
acres (See Brief of Respondent's pg. 4). 
The court below held that the language of 
reservation contained in the Warranty Deed dated June 
30, 1950, (R.219), whereby the real property in question 
was conveyed by THORNOCK' s predecessor in interest to 
Lawrence B. Johnson served to reserve to the gr an tor 
all mineral rights (R. 349 and 377). 
As COOK has not questioned that ruling on 
appeal, the remainder of the real property is not 
affected by COOK's assertion of adverse possession. 
- 3 -
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ARGUMENT 
Defendant-Appellant COOK, in her Brief in 
Support of Appellant's Pe ti ti on for Rehearing (herein-
after, "Appellant's Brief"), presents two arguments. 
The first is that an issue of fact exists as to the 
validity of the COOK-THORNOCK Quit-Claim Deed. The 
second, argued here for the first time, pertains to the 
alleged failure of THORNOCK to "specify the facts 
supposedly establishing a prior severance of surface and 
mineral estates". Those arguments will be discussed 
separately. 
POINT I 
THERE IS NO QUESTION OF FACT AS TO 
THE VALIDITY OF THE COOK-
THORNOCK QUIT CLAIM DEED 
COOK again asserts that a question of fact 
exists as to the validity of the COOK-THORNOCK Quit 
Claim Deed. This argument was considered by the lower 
court on three separate occasions and by this Court on 
COOK's initial appeal. 
Central to COOK' s renewed argument is the 
contention that in the context of a motion for summary 
judgment, "[t]here is to be no weighing of evidence or 
evaluation of credibility of witnesses" (Appellant's 
Brief pg. 4). 
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Admittedly, this proposition is correct, 
however, in the context of this appeal, the only evi-
dence before the court is COOK' s testimony. There is 
simply no conflicting testimony against which it might 
be weighed. 
As COOK' s testimony stands alone, apparently 
COOK wishes this court to question her own credibility. 
In the absence of conflicting testimony, THORNOCK 
assumes, as does this Court, that COOK testified truth-
fully. In summary, she testified that (1) the signature 
of Lois Cook appearing on the COOK-THORNOCK Quit Claim 
Deed appears to be her own (Cook depo. pg. 13 lns. 
19-24), ( 2) the signature which purports to be that of 
Howland J. Cook appears to be that of her deceased 
husband, (Cook depo. pg. 13 ln. 25, pg. 14 lns. 1-2), 
( 3) she knows of no facts which would tend to indicate 
that the signatures which appear on the Quit Claim Deed 
are other than what they purport to be, (Cook depo. pg. 
14 lns. 13-16), (4) the Quit Claim Deed was signed at 
the request of Aden w. Thornock (Cook depo. pg. 10 lns. 
11-16), (5) although she characterized her contacts with 
Aden W. Thornock as "hounding", she does not recall even 
the substance of Mr. Thornock's statements during those 
encounters (Cook depo. pg. 19 lns. 10-19, pg. 44 lns. 
15-25, pg. 45 lns. 1-5), (6) she was not threatened 
- 5 -
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or coerced by Aden W. Thornock (Cook depo. pg. 51 lns. 
19-25, pg. 52, lns. 1-13), (7) to her knowledge her 
deceased husband was neither threatened nor coerced 
(Cook depo. pg. 52 lns. 11-17, pg. 53 lns. 2-13), (8) 
the COOK-THORNOCK Quit Claim Deed was the only docume~ 
which she signed at the request of Mr. Thornock (Cook 
depo. pg. 51 lns. 4-18), and (9) Aden W. Thornock was 
not present at the time the Quit Claim Deed was signed 
(Cook depo. pg. 53 lns. 14-17). 
In spite of this testimony, COOK again asser~ 
at page 5 of her Brief, that a "triable issue of 
fact .•• [is] •.. raised by the defendant's Amended Answer". 
As this Court noted in its original opinion in this 
matter, a mere allegation is not sufficient to raise an 
issue of fact which will preclude the grant of summary 
judgment. 
In applying COOK' s statement that the Court 
may not consider credibility or weigh the evidence on 
the record, only one conclusion may be reached, i.e., 
there is no issue of fact as to the val id i ty of the 
Quit-Claim Deed because the record contains no con-
flicts. It is only if this Court questions COOK'S 
credibility and assumes, even absent contradicting 
evidence, that her testimony may be disregarded might a 
question of fact be found to exist. Of course, the 
- 6 -
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court may not question credibility or indulge in 
speculation. Simply stated, on the record there is no 
issue of fact. 
COOK also argues that summary judgment is "not 
usually appropriate where the issue concerns a subjec-
tive state of mind" (Appellant's Brief, pg. 6). Even 
assuming, arguendo, that this is correct, the issue must 
first be raised. In the context of this action, there 
is no issue of fact as to coercion or duress. 
A succinct and somewhat general definition of 
duress is found at 25 Am.Jur. 2d DURESS AND UNDUE 
INFLUENCE, §1 where it is stated: 
Generally speaking, duress may 
be said to exist whenever one, by 
the unlawful act of another, is 
induced to make a contract or to 
perform some other act under circum-
stances which deprive him of the 
exercise of free will. 
The "subjective state of mind" to which COOK 
refers is this deprivation of the "exercise of free 
will". In this regard, COOK has testified as follows: 
Q. [By counsel for Thornock] Did 
anyone force you to sign Exhibit 
"l" •.. [the Cook-Thornock 
Quit Claim Deed] • to your 
deposition? 
A. No. 
Q. Did anyone threaten you? 
A. No. 
- 7 -
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Q. Did anyone coerce you to sign 
Exhibit "l"? 
A. I signed it because my husband 
asked me to. 
(Cook depo. pg. 51 lns. 19-25) 
Clearly, COOK was not deprived of the exercise 
of her free will. In fact, her only testimony concern-
ing the conduct of Aden w. Thornock was an expression of 
irritation at his requests that the Quit Claim Deed be 
signed and a characterization of those requests as 
"hounding" (Cook depo. pg. 10 lns. 11-16). 
Neither COOK's testimony, nor any other 
evidence before this Court suffice to raise an issue of 
fact as to her "subjective state of mind" at the time of 
the signing of the Quit Claim Deed; rather, the record 
serves to demonstrate the absence of duress or coercion 
in the execution of that document. 
COOK relies on the Court's opinion in~ 
John's Bargain Stores Corp., 464 F.2d 111 (5th Cir. 
1972) in support of the proposition that summary judg-
ment is inappropriate where the defendant's "state of 
mind" is at issue. 
Ross, supra, was a products 1 iabli ty action. 
The issue of fact before the court was whether the 
retailer of an allegedly defective product should have 
known of the product's defect. The court noted that ~e 
- 8 -
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defendant retailer had filed an affidavit stating that 
it had no actual knowledge of the defect and that 
plaintiffs had filed an affidavit setting forth media 
publicity about the defect. In this context of con-
flicting affidavits, the court held summary judgment 
was inappropriate. 
The court's decision in ~os~, ~~£~, is 
distinguishable from the case at hand. In Ross, supra, 
the conflicting affidavits before the court presented an 
issue of fact as to whether the retailer should have 
known of the product's alleged defect. In the present 
case, the testimony of defendant alone is before the 
court. That testimony demonstrates the nonexistence of 
an issue of fact as to duress or coercion. Simply 
stated, in Ross, supra, the court was confronted with an 
unquestionable issue of fact created by opposing af-
fidavits while in the present situation no such issue of 
fact is present. 
COOK similarly urges that this Court's deci-
sion in Reliable Furniture Co. v. Fidelity & Guarantee 
Ins. Underwriters, Inc., 16 Utah 2d 211, 398 P.2d 685 
(1965) stands for the proposition that this Court is 
"adverse" to the grant of summary judgment where duress 
or coercision is an issue. A careful reading of that 
case reveals that it is procedurally dissimilar to the 
- 9 -
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case at hand. In Reliable Furniture, supra, defendant 
was granted summary judgment during the pre-trial 
conference. No Motion for Summary Judgment had been 
In view of this procedural irregularity, the filed. 
court stated: 
It is appropriate to reiterate 
that the dismissal of an action at 
pre-trial, which peremptorily turns 
a party out of court, is a drastic 
action which should be used sparing-
ly and with great caution. This is 
especially true where the dismissal 
was ordered without any motion for 
summary judgment being filed to put 
the party on notice of such contem-
plated action and afford him an 
opportunity to meet it. ( 398 P. 2d 
at 688) (emphasis added) 
In the procedural context of that case, it is 
clear that plaintiff did not have an opportunity to 
create a factual record. Based upon this absence of 
opportunity and the condition of the record, the court 
stated: 
Upon consideration of the 
record as it has come to us we 
cannot conCiude-wT-tiisucfl-certainty 
as to justify ruling as a matter of 
law that there was no duress 
(398 P.2d at 688) (emphasis added) 
The court, in Reliable Furniture, did not, as 
COOK contends, hold that summary judgment is inappropri-
ate where duress or coercion is an issue. The court 
held, that on the record in that particular case, where 
a Mo ti on for h d not been filed, Summary Judgment a 
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plaintiff should be entitled to present evidence. In 
the present case, COOK has had three opportunities to 
present any evidence whatsoever and has wholly failed so 
to do. 
COOK suggests that a review of transcribed 
testimony is an inadequate basis for a decision on a 
Motion for Summary Judgment because the court has not 
witnessed the demeanor of the witness. 
This suggested limitation upon the grant of 
summary judgment would, if adopted by this court, serve 
to render Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a 
nullity. If a court cannot render summary judgment 
without observing the demeanor of the witness, judgment 
could not be granted outside the parameters of a trial. 
In summary, COOK is correct in her assertion 
that the weighing of evidence and consideration of 
credibility is inappropriate in the context of a Motion 
for Summary Judgment. COOK's testimony as contained in 
her deposition should be given full credit without 
speculation as to her motives or what she might have 
said. In this action, evidence cannot be weighed as 
there is no conflict on the record. The record estab-
lishes that there is no question of fact as to the 
validity of the Quit-Claim Deed. 
As there is no question of fact, there is 
similarly no issue as to COOK'S "state of mind" at the 
- 11 -
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time of the execution of the COOK-THORNOCK Quit-Claim 
Deed. 
COOK's suggestion that transcribed testimony 
should not be the basis of a grant of Summary Judgment 
simply does not comport with the law, nor the practice 
of this jurisdiction. 
Throughout her argument COOK has failed to 
indicate one instance in the record which serves to 
create a question of fact as to the val id i ty of the 
Quit-Claim Deed. 
This Court's original opinion was correct, 
there is no question of fact as to the validity of the 
COOK-THORNOCK Quit-Claim Deed. COOK'S Petition for 
Rehearing on this basis should be denied. 
POINT II. 
COOK apparently presents several diverse 
arguments under her heading "Point II". They appear to 
be that ( 1) THORNOCK has failed to specify a basis for 
severance of the mineral and surface estate, therefore 
she is precluded from arguing that point, ( 2) COOK has 
obtained title by adverse possession because the mineral 
and surface estates have not been severed, (3) COOK may 
simultaneously assert and deny her title, and (41 
severance, · b · t a questi' on of fact. is y its very na ure, 
t ined For purposes of clarity, those various themes con a 
- 12 -
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
in the arguments presented in COOK's second point will 
be discussed separately. 
A. 
THE ISSUE OF SEVERANCE IS 
PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT 
COOK, for the first time, asserts THORNOCK has 
failed to "specify the facts supposedly establishing a 
prior severance of surface and mineral estates". 
(Appellant's Brief pg. 16) As this issue was not 
raised before the trial court, and was not raised on 
appeal, it may not properly be considered by this 
Court. 
As this Court noted in Dahlquist v. Denver & 
Rio Grande RR Co., 52 Utah 438, 174 P. 833 (1918): 
A rehearing will not be granted 
on the ground that petitioner has 
failed to argue an important point 
on the hearing. All points relied 
~Eon in support of a case must be 
£resented by the briefs and argu-
ments on appeal, and the practice of 
reserving certain points to be 
argued subsequently, in the event of 
an adverse decision, is condemned by 
the court. (citing 84 CJ 627, 628] 
(52 Utah at 469) (emphasis added) 
Should the Court consider COOK's belated 
argument, it remains somewhat surprising after three 
hearings in the court below and an appeal to this Court 
on the issues of reservation, the validity of a Quit 
Claim Deed, and the use of the mineral estate involved, 
- 13 -
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that COOK would contend she has not been advised of the 
basis for severance of the mineral estate. COOK notes 
in her own brief, " [ s] everance may be effected by ~ 
or by reservation or by adverse possession" (Appellant's 
Br i e f pg . 1 7 ) . Each of the primary issues in this 
action constitute a basis for severance and THORNOCK has 
raised those issues at each stage of the proceedings in 
this action. 
Without question, COOK has received notice of 
the bases for severance of the mineral estate from the 
surface estate in this action. 
B. 
THORNOCK'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
COMPLIES WITH THE REQUIREMENTS 
OF RULE 56, UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
COOK also urges, for the first time, that 
plaintiffs did not sufficiently specify the basis for 
summary judgment in their Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Rule 56, Q!~!!-~~~~-of_f_ivi_!._~.E.9.~du!!1 
provides in pertinent part: 
(a) Claimant. A party seeking 
to recover upon a claim, counter-
claim or cross-claim or to obtain a 
declaratory judgment may, at any 
time after the expiration of 20 days 
from the commencement of the action 
or after service of a motion for 
summary judgment by the adverse 
party, move with or without sup~ort­
ing affidavits for summary Judg-
ment in his favor upon all or any 
part thereof. 
- 14 -
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THORNOCK' s Motion clearly complies with the 
requirements of Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
in that it asserts by implication that there exists no 
question of fact and that plaintiffs are entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. 
Rule 56 contains no requirements that each of 
the various grounds for the grant of summary judgment 
which might exist in a given case be enumerated with 
specificity. If this Court were to accept COOK' s 
contention that such an enumeration is essential to the 
grant of summary judgment, motions for summary judgment 
would, of necessity, become lengthy documents containing 
denials of every possible defense which might be assert-
ed by the opposing party either at hearing or sub-
sequently on appeal. 
COOK has emphasized in her recent brief, 
that she did not raise the issue of adverse possession 
until after the filing of THORNOCK's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. In view of this factor, COOK should not be 
heard to protest the inclusion of a response to this 
argument in THORNOCK' s Memorandum in Support of Motion 
for Summary Judgment (R.55), rather than in the motion 
itself. At any rate, there is no question that the 
issues of adverse possession and severance were raised 
and addressed before the court below. 
- 15 -
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COOK'S suggestion that a Motion for summary 
Judgment must delineate each and every basis upon which 
summary judgment might be granted simply does not 
comport with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure or with 
the law of the State of Utah. For that reason, 
THORNOCK' s Motion for Summary Judgment was properly 
before the court below. 
c. 
COOK DID NOT OBTAIN TITLE TO THE 
MINERAL RIGHTS OF 353 ACRES BY 
ADVERSE POSSESSION 
COOK asserts, for the first time, in her 
Petition for Rehearing, that the mineral and surface 
estates were not effectively severed. 
Simply stated, three separate conveyances 
serve to sever the mineral from the surface estate; they 
are, the reservation of mineral rights in the THORNOCK-
Johnson and Johnson-COOK deeds and the conveyance of 
mineral rights in the COOK-THORNOCK Quit Claim Deed. 
(R. 219,220 and 224, respectively). 
COOK now argues, for the first time, before 
this Court, that the reservation of mineral rights found 
in the THORNOCK-Johnson and Johnson-COOK warranty De~s 
is insufficient to reserve those mineral rights to the 
granter. The court below found that the language of 
reservation contained in those documents was the result 
- 16 -
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of a scrivener error and held, as a matter of law, that 
the reservation clauses serve to reserve the mineral 
rights to the gr an tor. As COOK did not object to this 
finding on appeal, she is precluded from objecting 
to it at this point. 
COOK further asserts that the reservation is 
ineffective to create a severance of the surface and 
mineral estates for the reason that there exists a 
defect in her chain of title. 
COOK's rationale is that because her predeces-
sors in interest allegedly lacked title to the 353 acres 
in question, she obtained title by adverse possession. 
This theory is somewhat interesting, however, for 
purposes of argument, should the court apply it to the 
case at hand it is simi;arly applicable to Lawrence 
Johnson and his predecessors in interest. 
The chain of title to the disputed 353 acres 
may be traced to a warranty Deed, dated April 1, 1941, 
whereby Joseph and Katherine Hatch conveyed the entire 
1,946 acres to their four daughters (R. 245). As 
THORNOCK and Johnson, as well as their heirs, may 
similarly assert title to the entire property by virtue 
of adverse possession, the reservation clause contained 
in the Johnson-COOK warranty Deed effectively severed 
the mineral and surface estates as to the entire parcel 
conveyed, including the disputed 353 acres. 
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This Court in Michael v. Salt Lake Inc., 9 
Utah 2d 370, 345 P.2d 200 (1959), impliedly recognized 
that in the context of adverse possession under a 
written instrument, periods of possession by the 
claimant's predecessors-in-interest may be included in 
establishing adverse possession. 
Through application of the theory of adverse 
possession as it is advanced by COOK, it is clear that 
her predecessor-in-interest, Lawrence B. Johnson, had 
obtained title to the 353 acres in dispute through 
adverse possession. The periods of possession of his 
predecessors in interest may be "tacked" to his own. 
In short, title to the disputed 353 acres was vested in 
Lawrence B. Johnson at the time of his conveyance of the 
entire 1, 946 acres to LOIS s. COOK and Howland J. Cook, 
appellant's deceased husband. 
As Johnson held title by adverse possession ~ 
the 353 acres at the time of his conveyance of the sue 
to COOK, the reservation clause contained in the 
Johnson-COOK deed (R. 220) was effective to reserve to 
the granter all mineral rights, thereby severing the 
surface estate from the mineral estate. This severance 
is, of course, sufficient to preclude COOK's claim by 
adverse possession to the mineral rights. 
· t Claim need In addition, the COOK-THORNOCK QUl 
serves to sever the surface and mineral estates. 
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validity of that deed is discussed above and will not be 
addressed here. However, in addition to urging that the 
deed is invalid, COOK argues that no interest in the 353 
acres was conveyed by virtue of that deed because she 
did not have title to that portion of the land in 
question. Assuming for the sake of argument that the 
nature of COOK's possession of the minerals in question 
subsequent to the Johnson-COOK deed is sufficient to 
establish adverse possession, COOK had acquired title at 
the time of execution of the COOK-THORNOCK Quit Claim 
Deed. This is because the period of possession of her 
predecessor-in-interest, Lawrence Johnson, may be 
"tacked" to her period of possession. 
There is no question that COOK entered into 
possession of the subject land under claim of title 
based upon a written 'instrument. In this context, 
periods of occupancy by the claimant's predecessor-in-
interest are included in calculations of the period of 
adverse possession. As noted above, the period of 
adverse possession of the 353 disputed acres began on 
April 1, 1941, with the conveyance by Joseph and 
Katherine Hatch to their four daughters (R.245). 
Therefore, COOK had title, by adverse possession, to the 
353 acres at the time of the COOK-THORNOCK Quit Claim 
Deed. For this reason, the Quit-Claim Deed also serves 
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to sever mineral and surface estates, thereby precluding 
COOK's subsequent claim by adverse possession. 
On the record before this Court, there is no 
question that the mineral and surface estates have been 
severed, therefore COOK' s purported adverse possession 
of the surface does not extend to minerals. 
D. 
COOK IS PRECLUDED FROM SIMULTANEOUSLY 
ASSERTING A DEFECT IN HER CHAIN 
OF TITLE AND TITLE BY 
ADVERSE POSSESSION AGAINST THE 
RECORD TITLE HOLDER 
Apparently in response to this Court's holding 
that COOK' s allegation that her chain of title is 
defective serves to defeat her standing to challenge 
THORNOCK's title, COOK again argues that she may simul-
taneously assert and deny her claim of title. As no~d 
at 55 Am.Jur. 2d QUIETING TITLE §45: 
One cannot defeat a quiet title 
bill by showing that the complain-
ants claim or interest • . is 
subject to superior rights in third 
persons who are not parties to the 
suit; it is sufficient that the 
interest asserted by complainant in 
possession be superior to that of 
those who are parties defendant. In 
this regard, it has been said that 
the court determines the rights of 
the parties under the pleadings and 
evidence, grants proper relief, and 
determines the better title as 
between the parties to the pro-
ceeding, though a title superior to 
the rights of either party may be 
held by a stranger to the suit. 
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Without question, COOK entered into possession 
of the property in question under a claim founded upon a 
written instrument. By denying the validity of her 
chain of title, she simultaneously denies the val id i ty 
of her claim of title, thereby precluding her assertion 
of title by adverse possession. 
E. 
IN THE PRESENT CASE, SEVERANCE 
OF THE MINERAL AND SURFACE ESTATES 
IS NOT A QUESTION OF FACT 
COOK argues that the severance of mineral and 
surface estates is, by its very nature, an issue of 
fact. In sole support of this proposition she cites 
Toth v. Bigelow, 1 N.J. 399, 64 A.2d 62 (1949). 
In Toth, the plaintiff brought an action to 
quiet title. Defendant answered, denying certain 
allegations of the plaintiff's Complaint, thereby 
placing the jurisdiction of the New Jersey Court of 
Chancery in issue. The matter then came on for pre-
liminary hearing as to the jurisdictional issue and 
defendant's request for dismissal was denied. It is 
important to note, that at this juncture, only pleadings 
containing allegations had been exchanged. 
denial, defendant appealed. 
From this 
On appeal, the sole issue before the court was 
the existence of jurisdiction in the Court of Chancery. 
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That jurisdiction was challenged upon two grounds. As 
the court stated, [t]he first of these is the 
allegation that the respondent is not in possession of 
the land in question within the meaning of the statute" 
(64 A.2d at 63) (emphasis added). 
In their pleadings, bot~. parties claimed title 
to the mineral estate through different chains of title, 
both of which involved a severance of the surface and 
mineral estates. In order to maintain a Bill in 
Chancery, plaintiff would had to have proved possession 
of the mineral estate under color of title. Of course, 
this possession was challenged by the allegation of 
severance. 
In addressing this issue, the court in Toth, 
supra, noted that it was " . met at the outset by the 
preliminary question of whether it is necessary at this 
time to enter into an examination and interpretation of 
the instruments and their respective chains of title · · 
(64 A.2d at 64). The court appraised the issue 
confronting it as follows: 
In its essential elements the 
question is whether possession of 
the surface carries with it posses-
sion of the minerals underneath it 
in the face of an all~.9....§.!i_on of 
severance by a prior common 
owner .. 
(64 A.2d at 64) (emphasis added) 
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Confronted only with the allegations contained 
in pleadings, the court held that a mere allegation of 
severance was not sufficient to deprive the Court of 
Chancery of jurisdiction. That court then noted that 
the appellant would be afforded an opportunity to prove 
the severance as the action followed its normal course. 
(64 A.2d at 64). 
In essence, the court, in Toth, merely held 
that an allegation of severance of mineral and surface 
estates was not sufficient to deprive the Court of 
Chancery of jurisdiction. In the posture of that case, 
as it was presented upon appeal, the court was unable to 
render a decision upon the validity of the severance and 
it so stated. 
The stateme~t as contained in COOK's Brief in 
Support of Rehearing, at page 25, to the effect that 
"[t] he New Jersey Supreme Court held that the issue of 
interpretation of the deeds and of severance pertained 
to the merits of the case and should be resolved at 
trial is correct. However, COOK fails to 
note that, in Toth, the issue before the New Jersey 
court was not the validity of the severance, rather it 
was the existence of jurisdiction, and, most important-
ly, the record before that court consisted only of the 
allegations contained in pleadings. For that reason, 
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that court could not have ruled on the validity of the 
severance. 
The court's dee is ion in Toth is distinguish-
able from the present case on procedural, factual, and 
legal bases. Toth is simply inapposite! A careful 
reading of Toth reveals that it does not stand for the 
proposition that severance is, by its nature, an issue 
of fact. 
F. 
COOK HAS NOT ADVERSELY POSSESSED 
THE MINERAL ESTATE IN QUESTION 
Assuming, for purposes of argument, that COOK 
entered into adverse possession of the mineral estate of 
the 353 acres in question, she did so under a claim of 
title founded upon a written instrument, that is, the 
Johnson-COOK Warranty Deed. Therefore, the provisions 
of Sections 78-12-7 and -9, Utah Code Ann. (Repl. Vol.9A 
1977) are applicable. 
Pursuant to those provisions, the adverse 
claimant must have exclusive and hostile adverse pos-
session for a period of seven years before the claim by 
adverse possession ripens. 
The undisputed facts on the record before this 
· of the real Court are that COOK entered into possession 
property in question by Warranty Deed dated December 11 
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1952 (R. 220). On July 19, 1958, THORNOCK's predecessor 
in interest, Aden W. Thornock and Lucille Thornock, his 
wife, executed an Oil & Gas Lease whereby one J. R. 
Williams obtained mineral lease rights to a substantial 
portion of the real property to which COOK claims 
title by adverse possession. (~_. 91,93). This lease was 
recorded in the office of the Rich County Recorder on 
November 2, 1958. 
Both the execution of this lease and its 
recordation were within seven years of the date COOK 
entered into possession of the real property in ques-
tion. 
By virtue of the execution and recordation of 
this Oil & Gas Lease, COOK'S possession was neither 
exclusive nor hostile. Indeed, as the recording of a 
conveyance of an interest in real property is deemed, 
under the law, to provide notice to the world, COOK'S 
failure to object or protest this conveyance constitutes 
acquiescence in the use of the mineral estate, and 
assertion of ownership by THORNOCK. 
Because COOK's possession was neither ex-
clusive nor hostile, she did not adversely possess the 
mineral estate in question for a period of seven years, 
as required by 78-12-7, Utah Code Ann. (Rep!. Vol. 9A 
1977), therefore as a matter of law her claim by adverse 
possession must fail. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Appellants 
Petition for Rehearing should be denied. 
Respectfully submitted this 
~ day of February, 1980 
LERa.AL~ 
!'. Y7 Q~ 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Brief of Respondents in Opposition to 
Appellant's Petition for Rehearing was hand delivered 
this (,ell day fo February, 1980, to: 
Milton A. Oman, Esq. 
Attorney for Appellant 
Fifth Floor 
American Savings Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
/ f;Akki-1~' , I 
I ~. ) 
- 26 -Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
